# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

76-1083<sup>Ms</sup>

To be argued by SHEILA GINSBERG

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-


JAMES M. HENDRIX,

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 76-1083

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER, ESQ.,
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY,
Attorney for Appellant
JAMES M. HENDRIX
FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES UNIT
509 United States Court House
Foley Square
New York, New York 10007
(212) 732-2971

SHEILA GINSBERG,

Of Counsel.

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-	THE UNITED STATES
	rs.

CR 54 COSTANTINO

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DATE					PROCEEDINGS		
1/21/75	Before DOOLING	.J In	dictmen	nt f	Filed		
1-28-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty Simon Chrein						
	of Legal Aid present - deft arraigned and enters a plea of not						
-	guilty - case adjd to 3-14-75 - for all purposes. Motion for						
٠.	psychiatric examination - motion granted-submit Order.						
1-29-75	By COSTANTINO J - Order filed that the deft be committed to						
	Medical Center	for Fe	deral	Pri	soners, Spring	field, Mo	. to be
	examined as to	his me	ental c	ond	ition for a pe	riod not	to exceed
	60 days and th	and the same of the same of the same of	Contract agency words creep retain within	-		A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O	The second secon
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	indicated in	order a	and U.S	. At	ttorneys offic	e and afte	er ·
	examination ha	is been	comple	ted.	, the deft., i	f sane, sl	hall be
. 1	returned to t	he cust	ody of	+h	a II C Manahal		

. DATE .	PROCEEDINGS		CLERK		'S FFES	
1 00 -		PLAIN	TIFF	DEFE	NDANT	
1-30-7					T	
/31/75	Certified copy of order of 1/29/75 retd and filed- cop	ies m	ail.	ed to		
2-21-75	Federal Detention Headquartes					
	Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Mo.		-	-	-	
3/14/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft not present - c	ase a	di d	to 4	/14/7	
4-4-75 4-7-75	at 10:00 A.M. for all purposes  See entry on docket page D for correct information  By COSTANTINO J - Order filed that Dr.Irwin Perr be ad	mitte	d to			
	Federal Detention Headquarters, 427 West St., NYC. for	the	puri	ose	-	
	of interviewing the defendant. Copy to Mr.Chrein of Le					
4-14-75			1	21	-	
	Aid present - case adjd to May 16, 1975 for all purpos	es -	moti	on	-	
	for reduction of bail - bail reduced to \$200,000.00				-	
5-2-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty S. Chr	ein p	rese	ent -	-	
	Case set down for trial on June 16, 1975				_	
-5-75	By COSTANTINO J - Order filed that a psychiatrist herei	nafte	er			
	designated by the Govt be permitted to examine the deft	at Fe	eder	al D		
	Headquarters and further ORDERED that such psychiatrist				1-	
	by the Govt shall be permitted to employ such tests and				1-	
	as are necessary, etc. Copiesto Marshal.				1	
-16-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called & adjd to June 16, 19	75 fc	rt	rial	1	
5/12/75	Stenographers Transcript dated 5/2/75 filed			-	1	
/12/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Case adjd to 6/30/75 trial	at 1	0:00	AM.	for	
/30/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called- Deft end counsel pre	sent	. Tr	121	dor	
	and begun-jurors selected and sworn-Trial contd to 7/1/	75 at	10	:30 4	M	
/2/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel pre					
	contd to 7/3/75				-	
-1-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & counsel prese	nt -	tri	a1	-	
	resumed - trial contd to 7-2-75.				1-	
7-2-75	Before COSTANTINO J · case called - deft & counsel pres	ent -	tri	1	-	
	resumed -Trial contd to 7-3-75.				1	
7/3/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel pre	sent	Tri	al re	sume	
	Trial contd to 7/10/75 at 10:00 A.M.				-	
-	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel pres	sent-	Tres	01 -	-	
7/7/75			111	GI I	sume	
	111a1 contd to 7/8/73 at 10:30 A.M.	- 1	- 1			
7/7/75	Trial contd to 7/8/75 at 10:30 A.M.  Before COSTANTINO, J Case called- Deft and counsel pres  Motion to dismiss and judgment of acquittal denied-tria	ent-	Tri	al re	sume	

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DATE	PROCEEDINGS
7/9/75	Before COSTANTINO, J. Case called- Deft and counsel present-Trial
	Both sides rest-court charges jury-jury retires to deliberate-tria to 7/10/75
7/9/75	By COSTANTINO, J Orders of sustenance and xxxxxxxxx transportati
7/10/7.	lodging filed(4)  5 Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel present-Tria sumed-jury deliberations contd-Trial cond to 7/11/75
7/10/7	By COSTANTINO, J Orders of sustenance, lodging, and transportati
	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel present - Tri
	ed- Jury continues deliberations-Court wither aws juror No. 1 and d
	a mistrial djd to 7/31/75 at 10:00 A.M. for status report-b.
	By COSTANTINO, J Orders of sustenance filed(3)
	Stenographers Transcripts dated 6/30/75,7/1/75, 7/2/75, 7/3/75,
	7/8/75, 7/9/75, 7/10/75 and 7/11/75 filed
7/15/75	By MISHLER CH.J Order filed that Agustus F. Kinzel be permitted
	visit and interview the defendant at his place of incarceration
	Voucher for compensation for Expert Services filed. (HENDRIX)  By COSTANTINO J - Order filed that the U.S.Marshal is directed
	pay to Kenneth J. Gould the sum of \$15.34 to reimburse him for
	out of pocket expenses (a receipt for which is attached) for the
	jury in United States v.Hendrix.
7-31-7	5 Before EDSTANTINO J - case called - deft Hendrix & counsel
	Simon Chrein of Legal Aid present - adjd to 9-16-75 for trial.
9-17-7	5 Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft Hendrix & counsel
	Simon Chrein of Legal Aid present - Trial ordered and BEGUN-
-	Jurors selected and sworn - trial contd to 9-18-75.
9/18/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called - Deft and counsel present-Trial Trial contd to 9/19/75 at 11:30 A.M.
9-19-7	5 Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty present - trial
	resumed - trial contd to 9-22-75 at 11:00 am.
9/23/75	The same of the sa
	sumed-Govt rests-deft's motion to dismiss and for judgment of ac
	denied- trail contd to 9/24/75 at 10:00 A.M.
9-24-7	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty present -
	trial resumed - trial contd to 9-25-75 at 9:30 am.
9-25-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty present - trial resumed - Trial contd to 9-23-75

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
9-25-75	Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty present - trial
	resumed - trial contd to 9-26-75 at 9:30 am.
9-26-7	5 Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & atty present - trial
-/	resumed - Trial contd to 9-29-75.
9/29/75	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called- Deft and counsel present- Trial resum
3[27]13	jury retires to deliberate-jury returns and renders a verdict of guilty
	jury polled- and discharged- motion to set aside verdict denied- deft
	sentenced for sutdy and report pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a)(2)
9/29/75	By COSTANTINO, J Order of sustenance filed
9/29/75	Judgment and Commitment/Filed- certified copies to Marshal
9/29/75	Stenegraphers Transcript dated September 16,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26 fil
10-1-75	Stenographers transcript filed dated 9-29-75.
10-2-75	Certified copy of Judgment & Commitment retd and filed - dastes
	delixxxxx to MCC, NY
4-4-75	By COSTANTINO J - Order filed that the deft be committed to Kings
	County Hospital, Brooklyn, N.Y. to be examined as to his mental
	dondition etc. and that when such examination shall have been
	completed the deft shall be returned to the custody of the U.S.Marshal.
	(copies to Marshal) this entry inadvertently numbered/incorrectly
	by the U.S. Attorneys office
10-20-7	5 Voucher for Expert Services filed
12/29/75	Letter from deft dated 12/12/75 filed
	By COSTANTINO, J Memorandum and Order filed in regard to request by def
	for certain documents
2-20-7	6 Before COSTANTINO J - case called - deft & counsel S.Chrein present.
	Deft sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years., and is to receive treat-
	ment for his mental condition during his incarceration. Notice of
	Appeal to be filed in forma pauperis by the Clerk.
2-20-76	Judgment & Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal.
2-20-76	Notice of Appeal filed (no fee)
2-20-76	Docket entres and duplicate of Notice of Appeal mailed to the
	Court of Appeals.
2/25/76	Certified copy of Judgment and Commitment retd and filed- deft delivere
	to MCC
3/8/76	Copy of Order received from court of appeals that record be filed on or
3/0/10	before 3/24/76
3-12-75	
3/16/76	
3/10//0	

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

JAMES M. HENDRIX,

Defendant.

75CR 54

Cr. No.

(T. 18, U.S.C. \$§1111,

7 and \$233 E O

U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y

JAN 21 1975

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

TIME A.M....

- 1. On or about the 30th day of December 1974, on board the S. S. Eagle Voyager, a vessel belonging in whole to the Sea Transport Corporation, a corporation created by and under the laws of the State of Delaware, while the said vessel was within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, that is, on board the S. S. Eagle Voyager while docked at the Port of Odessa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the defendant JAMES M.

  HENDRIX, with malice aforethought and by means of manual strangulation did murder Robert E. Kiedinger. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111).
- 2. The Eastern District of New York is the federal judicial district into which the defendant JAMES M. HENDRIX was first brought following commission of the aforesaid offense.

  (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 7 and 3238).

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THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

We now come to the final stage of the proceedings. The Court will now charge you on the law to be applied to the facts in the case.

As you may recall, I initially gave you a pre-charge as to the manner in which the case would be presented to you. I told you that most of the evidence in the case would come in the form of the testimony of witnesses, and that you were to pay special attention to the manner in which the witnesses testified.

I believe I also instructed you that you would be the judges of the facts in the case, that being

2 your sole province; and that your recollection of the facts after having heard all of the evidence in the case -- the testimony of witnesses and the documentary 5 proof -- was to control the determination of the issues.

> Likewise at that time I told you that I would be the judge of the law. This has not changed at this stage of the proceedings. I will not review the facts in this case for you because I am certain that with summations by the attorneys there is no need for the Court to review the facts. In any event, if you find that there is some fact in the case that you may have forgotten or don't recollect, or you can't agree with each other in your deliberations, you can have it read back from the record, and that will, I am su: refresh your memory.

In any event, I am the judge of the law. You must accept what I say to be the law in this case.

Now the attorneys have been permitted by the Court and by the rules to make opening statements and summations to you. Under no circumstances are the statements they have made by way of opening or by way of summation to be taken as evidence. However the Court and the law does permit you to take

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the arguments that they have proffered before you and weigh those arguments. And if you agree with what they have said on either side of the case you may use those arguments in your deliberations and in discussing the case with each other, and try to convince one another as to what the final determination shall be with reference to the deliberations at hand.

If you feel that the arguments are not commensurate with the testimony and the proof in the case, you may disregard them. The arguments are not evidence. You need not weigh them. However, there are times when the arguments of the attorneys will give you an insight as to something you may have missed, and you may discuss that portion of it if you so desire.

Now, of course, I also said to you that during the trial, the Court will be the judge of the law. Likewise, as to motions which at times we had at a side bar, as you may recall. That was not for the purpose of keeping any of the proof from you, but were matters of law that were discussed between the attorneys and the Court itself and should not have come before you.

In any event, if you feel that you have discovered by some stretch of your imagination what this Court thinks as to either some of the testimony or the case itself, you should remove that from your mind because I tell you here and now I have come to no conclusion in this case nor have I indicated to you in any way whatsoever what my feeling is with reference to the facts in the case of with reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. That is your province and your job. You should not try to weigh what you believe the Court's impression may be.

You must understand that the lawyers who appear before you are advocates. They are advocating the best case they can for the parties they represent and they have a right to exercise as much forcefulness as they desire in their questioning or otherwise in presenting their case. I say this because this is within the framework of the ordinary trial.

You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try the issues of fact presented by the allegations of the indictment and the denial made by the 'Not-Guilty" plea of the accused. You are to perform this duty without bias or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit jurors to be

governed by sympathy, prejudice or bias. Both the accused and the public expect that you will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the case follow the law as stated by the Court and reach a just verdict, regardless of the consequences.

During my pre-charge I told you among other things that the guestions asked by the attorneys are never to be considered as evidence even though the question may contain a statement of evidence. You are reminded that only the answer to the question is evidence, if, of course, the question was answered.

Of course you know by this time that this case has come before you by way of an indictment presented by a Grand Jury sitting in this Eastern District. That indictment charges the defendant with the court I shall now read to you: Remember, the indictment is merely an accusation, merely a piece of paper. It is not evidence and is not proof of anything.

The indictment reads:

"On or about the 30th day of December, 1974, on board the S.S. EAGLE VOYAGER, a vessel belonging in whole to the Sea Transport Corporation, a corporation created by and under the laws of the

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Charge of the Court

State of Delaware, while the said vessel was within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, that is, on board the S.S. EAGLE VOYAGER while .docked at the Port of Odessa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the defendant, James M. Hendrix, with malice aforethought and by means of manual strangulation did murder Robert E. Kiedinger." Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111.

"The Eastern District of New York is the Federal judicial district into which the defendant James M. Hendrix was first brought following commission of the aforesaid offense." Title 18, United States Code, Sections 7 and 3238.

18 United States Code, Section 1111 states in pertinent part as follows:

Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

Two essential elements are required to be proved in order to establish the offense of second degree murder charged in the indictment:

First: The act of killing a human being unlawfully;

Second: Doing such act with malice

aforethought.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged; the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

"Unlawfully" means contrary to law. So, to do an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which is contrary to law.

An act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.

Malice aforethought is a state of mind showing a heart regardless of the life and safety of another.

Malice aforethought may also be defined as the condition of mind which prompts a person to do willfully, that is, on purpose, without adequate provocation, justification, or excuse, a wrongful act whose foreseeable consequence is death or serious bodily injury. Malice aforethought does not necessarily imply any ill will, spite or hatred towards the individual killed. In determining whether a wrongful act is done with malice aforethought, you

# Charge of the Court

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may infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done. In determining whether the defendant acted with malice aforethought, however, you should consider all facts and circumstances preceding, surrounding and following the killing; as shown by the evidence in this case, which tend to shed light upon the condition of mind and heart of the killer before and at the time of the deed.

Stated differently, malice aforethought means an intent at the time of the killing, willfully to take the life of a human being or an intent to act in callous and wanton disregard of the consequences to human life.

The defendant in this case asserts the defense of insanity.

You are not to consider this defense unless you have first found that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the offense. One of these elements is the requirement of malice aforethought, on which you have already been instructed. In determining whether that requirement has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider the testimony as to the defendant's abnormal

mental condition.

If you find that the Government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the offense, you must find the defendant not guilty.

If, however, you find that the Government has proved each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must consider the defense of lack of criminal responsibility, or as it is sometimes called, the defense of insanity.

The law provides that a jury shall bring in a verdict of not guilty if the following test is met:

The defendant must be found not guilty if, at the time of the criminal conduct, the defendant, as a result of mental disease, either lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, or lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

A defendant who is intellectually aware that his act is wrongful is not responsible for that act if he does not appreciate the wrongfulness of that act because mere intellectual awareness that conduct is wrongful, when divorced from appreciation or understanding of the moral or legal import of behavior can

have little significance.

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may have a mental disease or defect.

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Every man is presumed to be sane, that is, to be without mental disease or defect, and to be responsible for his acts. But that assumption no longer controls when evidence is introduced that he

The defense of lack of criminal responsibility, or as it is sometimes called, the defense of "insanity" does not require a showing that the defendant was disoriented as to time or place.

Mental disease includes any abnormal condition of the mind, regardless of its mental label, which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls. The term "behavior controls" refers to the processes and capacity of a person to regulate and control his conduct and his actions.

In considering whether the defendant had a mental disease at the time of the unlawful act with which he is charged, you may consider testimony in this case concerning the development, adaptation and functioning of these mental and emotional processes and behavior controls.

The burden is on the Government to prove

# Charge of the Court

Simon TlamRla follows

beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, or else that he nevertheless had substantial capacity both to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. If the Government has not established this beyond a reasonable doubt, you shall br ng in a verdict of not quilty.

In considering the defense of lack of criminal responsibility or insanity, you may consider the evidence that has been admitted as to the defendant's mental condition before and after the offense charged, as well as the evidence as to defendant's mental condition on that date. The evidence as to defendant's mental condition before and after that date was admitted solely for the purpose of assisting you to determine the defendant's condition on the date of the alleged offense.

(continued on next page)

evidence of psychiatrists who testified as expert witnesses. An expert in a particular field is permitted to give his opinion in evidence. In this connection, you are instructed that you are not bound by medical labels, definitions, or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease. Why psychiatrists and psychologists may or may not consider a mental disease for clinical purposes where their concern is treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease for the purpose of determining criminal responsibility. Whether the defendant has a mental disease must be determined by you under the explanation of those terms as it has been given to you by the Court.

There is also testimony of lay witnesses with respect to their observations of the defendant's appearance, behavior, speech, and actions. Such persons are permitted to testify as to their own observations and other facts known to them, and may express an opinion based upon those observations and facts known to them.

You may consider the circumstances of each witness,
his opportunity to observe the defendant, and to know
the facts to which he has testified, his willingness

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### Charge of the Court

and capacity to expound freely as to his observations and knowledge, the basis for his opinions and conclusions, and the nearness or remoteness of his observations of the defendant in point of time to the commission of the offense charged.

observed extraordinary or bizarre acts performed by the defendant, or whether the witness observed the defendant's conduct to be free of such extraordinary or bizarre acts. In evaluating such testimony, you should take into account the extent of the witnesses' observation of the defendant, and the nature and length of time of the witnesses' contact with the defendant. You should bear in mind that an untrained person may not be readily able to detect mental disease, and that the failure of a lay witness to observe abnormal acts by the defendant may be significant only if the witness had prolonged and intimate contact with the defendant.

You are not bound by the opinions of either expert or lay witnesses. You should not arbitrarily or capriciously reject the testimony of any witness, but you should consider the testimony of each witness in connection with the other evidence in the case, and

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### Charge of the Court

give it such weight as you believe it is fairly entitled to receive.

You may also consider that every man is presumed to be same, that is, to be without mental disease, and to be responsible for his acts. A presumption may, however, be overcome by evidence. You should consider these principles in the light of all the evidence in the case, and give them such weight as you believe they are fairly entitled to receive.

Where a defendant has raised the issue of his insanity, and the jury finds from the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not insane at the time of the alleged offense, it is still the duty of the jury to consider all the evidence in the case which may aid determination of state of mind, including all evidence offered on the issue as to insanity, in order to determine whether the defendant acted or failed to act with the requisite malice aforethought, as charged.

If the evidence in the case leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt whether the mind of the accused was capable of acting with the requisite malice aforethought to commit the crime charged, the jury should acquit the accused.

### Charge of the Court

As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

There is evidence in this case tending to show that the defendant was intoxicated prior to and at the time of the alleged commission of the homicide.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime, then the fact that he may have been intoxiated does not relieve the defendant of any criminal responsibility.

You have also heard testimony that the defendant smoked hashish. You should weigh such evidence only as it bears on the crime charged in the indictment which I have read to you and only that crime. The defendant does not stand accused of a drug charge.

You may hear me sometimes refer to direct evidence and to circumstantial evidence, and it is well to explain now the difference between these two types of evidence.

Direct evidence is where a witness testified to what he saw, heard or observed, what he knows of his own knowledge, something which comes to him by virtue of his senses.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts

Charge of the Court

facts which reasonably follow in the common experience of mankind. Stated somewhat differently, circumstantic evidence is that evidence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts which have a logical tendency to lead the mind to a conclusion that those facts exist which are sought to be established.

Circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct evidence, for in either case you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant.

Thus, the defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate and with no evidence against him, and the law permits nothing but legal evidence to be presented before a jury to be considered in support of any charge against the accused. So the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless you, the jury, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

It is not required that the Government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt, and reasonable doubt is doubt based

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### Charge of the Court

upon reason and common sense, the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it unhesitatingly in the most important of your own affairs.

You, the jury, will remember that a defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.

The batten is always upon the prosecution to prove quilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant. The law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses, or producing any evidence. If the jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence, the other of guilt, you, the jury, must, of course, adopt a conclusion of innocence.

I have said that the defendant may be proven guilty either by direct or circumstantial evidence. I have said that direct evidence is the testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. Also, circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances, indicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. You, the jury, may make

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Charge of the Court

common sense inferences from the proven facts.

It is not necessary that all inferences drawn from the facts in evidence be consistent only with guilt, and inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The test is one of reasonable doubt, and should be based upon all the evidence, the testimony of the witnesses, the documents offered into evidence, and the reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the proven facts.

An inference is a deduction or conclusion which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from the facts which have been proved. You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the evidence, you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. On the contrary, you are permitted to draw, from the facts which you find have been proved, such reasonable inferences as seem justified in the light of your own experience.

A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced, but also from a lack of evidence. Since the burden is upon the prosecution to prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime charged, a defendant has the right to rely upon failure of the prosecution to establish such proof.

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# Charge of the Court

You as jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony deserves, and it goes without saying that you should scrutinize all the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness' intelligence, motive and state of mind, and his demeanor and manner while on the stand. Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has testified, and whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these matters. Consider also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case; the manner in which each witness might b e affected by the verdict; and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies or discrepanc in the testimony of a witness, or between the testimony of different witnesses, may or may not cause the jury to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transaction may see or hear it differently, and innocent misrecollection, like failure of recollection, is not an uncommon experience.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance, or an unimportant detail, and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or intentional falsehood.

As to making your own judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves.

When a defendant in a case of this kind takes the stand, which he has a perfect right to do, he is subjected to all the obligations of witnesses, and his testimony is to be treated like the testimony of any other witness; that is to say, it will be for you to say, remembering the substance of his testimony, the manner in which he gave it, his cross-examination, and everything else in the case, whether or not he told the truth. Then, again, it is for you to remember, you have a perfect right to do so, the very grave interest the defendant has in the case. As he places himself as a witness, he stands like any other witness.

Evidence that at some other time a witness, other than the accused, has said or done something, or has failed to say or do something, which is inconsistent with the witness' testimony at the trial, may be considered by the jury for the sole purpose of judging

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the credibility of the witness; but may never be considered as evidence or proof of the truth of any such statement.

Where a witness is a defendant on trial in the case, and, by such statements or other conduct, the defendant admits some fact against his interest, then the statement or other conduct, if knowingly made or done, may be considered as evidence of the truth of the fact so admitted, as well as for the purpose of judging the credibility of the defendant as a witness.

An act or omission is "knowingly" done if done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident, or other innocent reason.

Every witness' testimony must be weighed as to its truthfulness. If you find any witness lied as to any material fact in the case, then the law gives you certain privileges. One of those privileges is that you have the right to disregard the entire testimony of that witness. If you find, however, that you can sift through that testimony and determine which of the testimony was true and which was false, then the law allows you to take the portions which were true and weight it, and disregard those portions which were false. That again is within your prerogative.

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The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying on either side. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence to determine which of the witnesses are worthy of greater credence. You may find that the testimony of a smaller number of witnesses on one side is more credible than the testimony of a greater number of witnesses on the other side.

You are not obliged to accept testimony, even though the testimony is uncontradicted and the witness is not impeached. You may decide, because of the witness' bearing and demeanor, or because of the inherent improbability of his testimony, or for other reasons sufficient to you that such teatimony is not worthy of belief.

The Government is not required to prove the essential elements of the offense as defined in these instructions by any particular number of witnesses.

The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of an essential element of the offense charged, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness is telling the truth.

Testimony was introduced as to the defendant's

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mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. A layman may give an opinion on the issue of insanity only on the basis of facts known to him. An expert, however, may base his opinion on the facts which he has observed, or on the facts which he has heard others relate, or on hypothetical facts based on the evidence.

Expert testimony on the issue of the defendant's sanity is not binding on the jury, and you may reach a contrary conclusion on the basis of other evidence in the case. You should, however, consider it together with all the other evidence in the case in determining the defendant's mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the indictment.

There is nothing peculiarly different in the way a jury should consider the evidence in a criminal case, from that which all reasonable persons treat any question, depending upon evidence presented to them.

You are expected to use your good senses; consider the evidence in the case for only those purposes for which it has been admitted, and give it a reasonable and fair construction, in the light of your common knowledge of the natural tendencies and inclinations of human beings.

If an accused be proved quilty beyond reasonab le

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doubt, say so. If not proved guilty, say so.

Keep constantly in mind that it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict of guilty upon anything other than the evidence in the case; and remember as well that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

In making the factual determination on which your verdict will be based, you may consider only the exhibits which have been admitted in evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses as you have heard it in this courtroom.

The punishment provided by law for the offense charged in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of the Court, and should never be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Now, in this type of case there must be a unanimous verdict. That means all twelve of you must agree, and it goes without saying that it becomes incumbent upon you to listen to one another, and to argue out the points among yourselves in order to determine in good conscience whether your fellow jurors' argument is one commensurate with yours, or whether at

have no right to stubbornly or idly sit by and say,

"I'm not talking to envone," "I am not going to

discuss it," because people with common sense and the

ability to reason must communicate. They must

communicate their thoughts. So, anything which appears

in the record, and about which one of you may not agree

-- talk it out amongst yourselves, and then if you

can't agree as to what is in the record, well, you can

ask the Court to have that portion of the testimony read

back to you. You may do so by knocking on the door and

giving a note in writing to the clerk, who will then

present it to the Court, and I will then bring you

into the courtroom.

If any reference by the Court or by counsel to matters of evidence does not coincide with your own recollection, it is your recollection which should control during your deliberations.

You, Juror No. 1, are the Foreman. You will preside over the deliberations, and you will be the spokesman here in court.

You have the following forms of verdict which you can bring in this case. It being a one count

indictment, the form of your verdict will be:

If you fig. the defendant not guilty, the form of your verdict is, "We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty."

If you find the defendant guilty, you may announce it as, "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty."

Those are the two forms of verdict.

(continued next page)

That is the Court's charge at this time. The marchals will now be sworn and they will take you to the deliberating room.

(The marshal was thereupon sworn by the deputy clerk of the courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, follow the marshal.

Oh, the alternates at this time. Bring them back. Just one second.

(The jury having partially left the courtroom thereupon returned to the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I have two thoughts at this time.

The first thought is that the alternates must be discharged and no longer go into the jury room with the prime jury of twelve people who were chosen.

My second thought is since it is 12:00 o'clock

I am going to have you go out to lunch and in this

way you will have missed most of the rush in the

restaurants, and then have you brought back and at

that time deliberate. While you are lunch do not

discuss the case in public. Wait until you get back

to the jury room to discuss it, any part of it.

In addition I will permit the two alternates to go to lunch with you on condition that the case is

not discussed at lunch.

Immediately after lunch the two alternates will be discharged and they need not come back to the jury room or the courtroom. Your jury service will then be recognized. Okay. Do not discuss the case at this time.

(The jury thereupon retired from the courtroom at 12:00 o'clock noon.)

MR. CHREIN: Your Honor, if jury asks to see specific exhibits such as the Government's hashish or the statement --

THE COURT: No, the hashish will not be permitted to go into the jury room.

MR. CHREIN: No. But I was thinking more in terms of the statement. Is there any reason why I shouldn't leave these documents with the Clerk?

THE COURT: No. Leave them with us. We will make a ruling at this time that any of the exhibits with the exception of the hashish which has been marked in evidence will be submitted to the jury if they request them.

MR. CHREIN: Without the need of summoning counsel.

THE COURT: Without the need of summoning counsel.

## AFTERNOON SESSION

(The jury thereupon returned to the courtroom at 3:15 p.m.)

(Jury note referred to was received and marked Court's Exhibit 1.)

THE COURT: All right, good afternoon. I received a note marked Court's Exhibit 1 now:

"Required testimony psychological report of Dr. Taub, Rutgers University while defendant was in detention (recently)," signed by the Foreman.

There is no testimony by Dr. Taub, or there are no papers in evidence by Dr. Taub or anyone connected with Rutgers University about the defendant.

Now, you will recall I said that papers that are marked for identification are not permitted to be seen by the jury.

THE POSEMAN: This was remembered in the arguments.

THE COURT: If there was reference to a Dr. Taub who examined him in Springfield, if that is what you are talking about, it is not in evidence. The reference is in evidence that there has been some discussion.

But there was no report by him that was in evidence that you can look at.

THE FOREMAN: Could we hear the testimony

relating to the reference?

THE COURT: You can hear that. We will try to find it now.

Are you going to stay there and wait for a few minutes while we see if we can locate it?

THE COURT: Well, we may need discussion about it to agree as to which part of it you will hear. The testimony relating to Dr. Taub?

MR. CHREIN: Your Honor, could the jury go back?

THE FOREMAN: It was quoted by one of the psychiatrists.

THE COURT: Yes, Dr. Kinzel.

(The jury thereupon retired from the courtroom.)

MR. CHREIN: Just one question, your Honor.

I think since the jury characterized Dr. Taub from
Rutgers --

THE COURT: They don't characterize him from Rutgers. Dr. Taub, Rutgers U, whatever that was, while the defendant was in detention. I don't know what that means.

MR. CHREIN: Dr. Perr was from Rutgers.

THE COURT: They said Dr. Taub. We will stay with him now.

MR. CHREIN: Perhaps we can have that matter

cleared up.

THE COURT: How can you clear that up? They volunteered it to me. I didn't ask them. They want Dr. Taub.

IR. DAWSON: Can we have a moment to look for
it?

THE COURT: I think it was the next to the last day.

I have something on page 717:

"I'm going to show you defendant's Exhibit U
for Identification, which is a report on the
stationary of the College of Medicine and Dentistry,
Rutgers Medical School, signed by Irving M. Pia, and
I ask you if you have seen that in connection with your
studies in this case."

MR. DAWSON: That is not the same. I think it came about on my cross-examination of Dr. Kinzel.

THE COURT: That was the next day. I think so, too.

MR. DAWSON: I have gotten up to 792 without reference to any doctor.

MR. CHREIN: I think it is on 796.

THE COURT: There was something about it. It didn't mention his name vet.

MR. CHREIN: He is being shown the report from

Springfield at that point. 1 THE COURT: Yes. Let's see now. 798: there anything else in this report, Doctor?" 3 He is talking about a psychologist. He gave the 4 definition of psychologist. I do not see his name 5 6 vet. 7 All right, 802: "All you aware of what is that gentleman's 8 name, Dr. Taub." At the bottom of the page, twenty-9 10 four: "Are you aware of having read his report? 11 "Yes." 19 And let's see now. 13 MR. DAWSON: (803 on top. 14 THE COURT: Yes. That he said in his opinion 15 the defendant was making every effort to appear 16 psychotic and he questioned defendant's motive for 17 trying to give him that appearance. Right. 18 MR. DAWSON: Then we have the answer. 19 THE COURT: That is what he said, yes. 20 Then that is answered. 2 Now then you go down to the witness'having a 22 number of problems with this report --23 IR. DAWSON: I think that is all I asked him. 24 THE COURT: That is all. 25

1	Vous Honor
2	Your Honor, can I just see if the matter was
	gone into on redirect.
3	THE COURT: Yes. That was that. Redirect
4	starts on 839 or 840. All right, now the first ques-
5	tion the first page is Dr. Perr.
6	MP. CHREIN: On 845.
7	THE COURT: Yes, I see it.
8	MR. DAWSON: That was objected to and sustained.
9	MR. CHREIU: I understand that.
10	MR. DAWSON: It was objected to and sustained.
11	MR. CHREIN: Your Honor, I would request
12	MR. DAWSON: Just a moment. Let me read
13	through.
14	THE COURT: Down at the bottom.
15	MR. DAWSON: Which page, Judge?
16	THE COURT: The same page:
17	"Doctor, does the report of Dr. Taub does
18	the conclusion of D: Taub recommend that the defendant
19	be brought back for trial or recommend treatment before
20	trial."
21	That was sustained likewise. I think you
22	dropped it at that.
23	MR. DAWSON: I think that is all there is.
24	THE COUPT: We had better make sure.
25	MR. DAWSON: That is it.

MR. CHREIM: Can I ask this question, after reading the material from Dr. Taub, which is that one que tion and answer, would the Court -- since 3 they seem to be interested in the defendant's condition 4 at Springfield -- would the Court ask if that is all 5 they want from the Springfield report. And it doesn't 6 necessarily invite comment --7 THE COURT: There is nothing else. What am I 8 going to ask them? 9 MR. DAWSON: We can only respond to specific 10 questions. 11 THE COURT: It is where the evidence is now. 12 I can't respond to anything else. 13 MR. DAWSON: I think the bottom of 802 and top 14 of 803 is the only reference to Dr. Taub. 15 THE COURT: Other questions were sustained. 16 I think it is fair to say that. 17 MR. DAWSON: Yes. 18 THE COURT: Questions on redirect were sustained. 19 MR. CHREIN: What line does the Court intend to have read back? From what point? THE COURT: There is only one place. 22 MR. DAWSON: Line 25 on page 202 up to line 5 23 on page 303. 24

THE COURT: That is all.

MR. CHREIN: In other words, I would submit 1 that perhaps we ought to identify the the psychologist 2 3 THE COURT: All right, we will start with line 4 20. O.K. Now did you say senior psychologist? Are 5 you aware of what that gentleman's name is, Doctor? 6 That will follow in sequence. 7 8 MR. DAWSON: Yes. 9 THE COURT: Bring in the jury. (The jury thereupon returned to the courtroom 10 11 at 3:26 p.m.) THE COURT: We have found the one place and we 12 13 will have it read to you. (The reporter thereupon read from line 20 at 14 page 802 to line 5, page 803.) 15 THE COURT: That is all there is reference to 16 Dr. Taub. There were other questions asked on redirect 17 but the objections to the questions were sustained. 18 And where it is sustained it is not in evidence so 19 that you need not consider it. (The jury thereupon retired from the courtroom

(Continued on next page.)

at 3:23 p.m.)

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1	(The following occurred at 4:30 o'clock P.M.)
DS:GA T2R1PM 2	THE COURT: All right, bring in the jury.
3	THE CLERK: Jury note, marked as Court Exhibit
4	number 2.
5	(Document referred to was received and marked
6	Court's Exhibit number 2.)
7	THE CLERK: Mr. Foreman, Ladies and Gentlemen
8	of the Jury, have you agreed upon a verdict?
9	THE FOREMAN: We have.
10	THE CLERK: How do you find the defendant,
11	Guilty or Not Guilty?
12	THE FOREMAN: We find the defendant Guilty.
13	THE CLERK: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury,
14	as the Court has received your verdict, you say you
15	find the defendant Guilty, and so say you all.
16	MR. CHREIN: May we have the jury polled?
17	THE COURT: You may be seated, please (address-
18	ing Foreman).
19	Poll the jury.
20	THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is that your verdict?
21	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
22	THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is that your verdict?
23	JUROR NO. 2: Yes, it is.
21	THE CLERK: Juror No. 3, is that your verdict?
25	JUROR NO. 3: Yes.

	1037
1	THE CLERK: Juror No. 4, is that your verdict?
2	JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
3	THE CLERK: Juror No. 5, is that your verdict?
4	JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
5	THE CLERK: Juror No. 6, is that your verdict?
6	JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
7	THE CLERK: Juror No. 7, is that your verdict?
8	JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
9	THE CLERK: Juro No. 8, is that your verdict?
10	JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
11	THE CLERK: Juror No. 9, is that your verdict?
12	JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
13	THE CLERK: Juror No. 10, is that your verdict?
14	JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
15	THE CLERK: Juror No. 11, is that your verdict?
16	JUROR NO. 11: Yes.
17	THE CLERK: Juror No. 12, is that your verdict?
18	JUROR NO. 12: Yes.
19	THE CLERK: Jury polled.
20	THE COURT: All right, the jury has been polled.
21	It has been found to be uranimous that the defendant
22	is guilty of the count that he has been charged with.
23	That terminates your service. And I want to
24	thank you very much for being in my courtroom. I am
25	sure that you made your determination to the best of

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THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I have something I would like to read.

THE COURSE You may read to.

THE DEFENDANT: "F, a med stendrin, presented with an emique on of medicining one as most consisted and an emission of medicine and an emission of medicine and an emission of medicine and an emission of the emission of the

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of all governments where they have been parmitted to think and speak freely. Please, as you hold in my faith -- a delicate rasp with thy -- your Honor's hand, consider not to some sysulf personally, an economic wain or acquire a mifartly or similar -one of woral expression. I continue a verbal assault and transgrass. They are continually and successfully accorded and avoided when possible. Had attack, to my thunking them and now that I would have quite possibly been todomicaly raped. My notion was on offense aditated with a fear and confuctor, please do not as 7 am not -- the rage which t unfortunately takt were the results of the counteraction that became so violently travic.

"Fleags note at the time of the offense, the incapacity, although I fully understand there was no leval excurs for the despicable behavior and connicerraceios mich be a convected me of taking of presented with the grantation enterience that I have wish pastice oferse consider the dedicted assented

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which I have never burgaless for.

i have yet not been able to grace that trains first by mind. I have rade and conviction that my hearth, by facilities would not prevail atain The all poly or will again I do must anxiously ask your Moros, of age to acc as -- T hold cof prejudice against homosexuals in its own right. I have designically no quartal with the behavior. I does not passed conosexual value to be transcressed upon byself. Che panic into chich I fell -- because of rotal -- because of moral -- confirmed in the belief thes Cod created waren for man and vice versa, these procepts of this philosophy have been troubt and bred and is also instinctively in my nature and has been appealled by pervented attempt -- be -- be -- the liberty of conscience for nimself to resist Songeful top, these are the griddences which I have at lande e chia buchen oc a free lee . .

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nature -- the jury system is the servant of the poople. Please open your heart, your Honor, to liberalize and expand on the great coinions of the right -- but a government consistent with the heart of its people and its interests, that your Monor might add the restoration of that tranquility for which I humbly petition you. This, your Honor, this is my only hope, that you be pleased to emphasize the earnest endeavor and to parpetuate and endura the right of my mind against the offense -- to help establish something between mind and body, mind and spirit, that it may continue -- I pray that thy Monor wi - preserve liberty and freedom. It is with heartfelt satisfaction that I have been allowed to address thy Honor before thy judicial system --" MR. CHREIN: I have nothing further to add, your Honor. THE COURT: You have nothing further to say, Mr. Hendrix?

The approximation of the stands was

THE DEFENDANT: No, six. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Dawson?

MR. DAMSON: Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: Who Court than it ready to santance the defendant. The Court that of all wishes to place upon the record that because of

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and gravity of the crime itself and the seriousness and gravity of the crime will not give the defendant youth correction treatment, although his age would require the Court to consider such treatment.

As to the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant, this is probably one of the most serious types of crime that a person can commit, of taking a life of an individual, whether it be during an emotional and passionate situation. Whether it be during a deliberate attack without emotion or passion. Decause of that, of course it must be of necessity, incarcaration for a period. So that a person who has committed that type of crime may at least not comport again and commit a similar type crime.

trial, the first trial and the second trial, that the question of the attitude of the defendant and the mental attitude of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime was one of the issues that had to be determined by the jury. The first jury was incapable of doing so. It wasn't a fact whether he knew the nature of the crime, but the condition of 's mind at the time.

The second jury did find the defendant guilty as charged.

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That being so, this Court must then impose what it believes would be a fair, just and reasonable sentence unless the circumstances.

Taking into consideration the defendant, his background, the vary, very lister. Life that he has led, lack of family relationship, mother, father, broken home, numerous things that led up to his situation where it places him before the Court at this time at the rerev of the Court, seriousness of the crist that was consisted at a port in Russia, and it is still the allegation that this crime was committed because of an artack to say the least might have been improper and he claims he might have been consummated if he hadn't fought, the Court takes into consideration the continued attack of the person and if he had subdued the person, if that were the fact, and I assume the jury found the same facts that being so, this Court takes into consideration all the factors placed upon the record and finds that every defendant that comes before the Co. of has some good and that good either by incarceration or otherwise can be brought forth.

He is desinitely in need of some type of treatment for his depressive state that he fails into from time to time. Because of that the Court

likewise considers the sentence—that it will impose upon him. That being so, I find that this Court has a transmous latitude in the length of sentence that could be imposed upon this defendant, anywheres from 30 years fown to one year. That being so, this Court finds that a fair and reasonable just sentence under the circumstances, considering the taking of the life of an individual, regardless of the circumstances that caused the taking of that life, that this defendant is sentenced to nine years in jail. And that he shall receive treatment for his mental condition and treatment to rehabilitate him.

That is the Court's sentence.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. CHREIN: Your Honor, inasmuch as there was a verdict at the trial and inasmuch as the defendant was represented as an indigent defendant by the Federal Defenders unit of the Legal Aid society, the defendant would request the Court to file a notice of appeal.

MR. DAWSON: I have prepared the necessary forms and an affidavit of indigency.

THE COURT: The Court must advise you that you have a right to an appeal from a jury verdict.

If you do not have sufficient funds a lawyer shall be continued to be supplied by the Legal Ald Society and you have a right to appeal in forma pauperis and the minutes, which have already been given to you, shall likewise be afforded for the sentence.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I wish to thank you very sincerely.

(Whereupon, these proceedings were concluded.)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Jung 14, 19/0

I certify that a copy of this brief and appendix has been mailed to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

Seile Dersoe